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Curriculum tracking creates incentives before its start, and we
should expect scores in tested subjects to be higher at that point.
I nd evidence from both UK and international data for sizable in-
centive eects. Incentive eects are important from a methodological
perspective because they lead to downward bias in value-added esti-
mates of the later age eect of tracking on achievement. They also
invalidate placebo tests that work by regressing pre-tracking scores on
tracking policies.
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11 Introduction
Curriculum tracking is the explicit separation of students into schools or
classes based on observed past or expected future achievement. While it is
uncommon to explicitly track on the primary level, and the norm is to do so
on the tertiary, there are large dierences in tracking policies on the secondary
level. Since the Second World War, some countries have postponed tracking
from the end of primary school to the end of middle school or even to the
end of high school, while others have left their tracking policies unchanged
(Benn and Chitty 1996, p. 7). This makes questions on the eects of tracking
highly relevant. At the same time, the variation in tracking policies, both
temporal and spatial, provides us with a means to identify its eects.
The literature has mainly focused on the long-term, net eect of tracking
on educational achievement and wages, measuring outcomes after the end
of compulsory education or later. While the eect of tracking on mean test
scores may be positive (Kim et al. 2003, Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles 2004,
Duo et al. 2008) or negative (Hanushek and Woessmann 2006, Pekkarinen
et al. 2009), there is a consensus among these authors that tracking also
increases dierences between students. Tracking probably reduces intergen-
erational mobility as well (Brunello and Checci 2007, Maurin and McNally
2008).
It is however also important to look at early-age eects of tracking policies
on student outcomes. Specically, tracking creates incentives before its start,
amongst others for students to work harder and try to get into a higher track.
The tracking point is thus a high-stakes moment for the student, whether
the track choice is based on an explicit test or not. Bishop (1998) and Jacob
(2005) nd that high-stakes tests lead to higher student achievement. This is
a subset of a more general literature which shows that students and teachers
respond to incentives (Bishop 2006).
Waldinger (2006) mentions the possible existence of incentive eects, and in
the model of Eisenkopf (2009), tracking makes educational signaling more
ecient by shifting incentives to an earlier age. Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles
2(2004) nd incentive eects in UK data, but the main focus of their paper is
on post-tracking outcomes.
I add to this literature by making a comprehensive empirical analysis of
incentive eects of tracking. I show that incentive eects are well identied
in UK data, and that a similar pattern can be found in international data.
Incentive eects have methodological implications. The existence of incentive
eects makes value-added estimates of the later age eects of tracking (e.g.
Hanushek and Woessmann 2006, cf. Todd and Wolpin 2003) misspecied.
Pre-tracking test scores are not exogenous, but positively related to early
tracking, leading to a downward bias in tracking estimates that use early
test scores to control for unobservables.
A second implication that a positive relationship between pre-tracking scores
and tracking policies cannot be used as an argument that there is selection
in post-tracking regressions (e.g. Manning and Pischke 2006).
2 Incentives
In theory, the incentives from tracking may work in many ways. The most
direct incentive eect is through students. It pays for them to work harder
before the tracking point in order to end up in the higher track. Attending the
higher track will give the student a better peer group, which will increase his
future achievement (Hoxby 2000, Ammermueller and Pischke 2006). Upper
track attendance will also usually leave open the possibility to enter university
at the end of secondary school, and is a labor market signal of ability of its
own. All these factors give the student an incentive to substitute eort
towards the pre-tracking period.
The student may also substitute eort between subjects: from nontested
subjects to tested ones. This is indeed the case in Jacob (2005), but not
in Winters et al. (2008) who suggest that positive spillover eects from the
tested subjects compensate for the crowding-out of nontested ones.
3Teachers have an incentive to teach better as well as to substitute time and
eort towards tested subjects. It seems a reasonable assumption that teachers
should do this for their students' sake, but it may also be in their own interest
to do so. The track placement of students (and the possible test preceding
it) makes teacher quality more visible, and makes it easier for principals
to reward and punish teacher eort as well as easier for parents to choose
better schools for their children. Teachers do indeed change their behavior
in expected ways in Jacob (2005).
Even if primary school students may not grasp the full consequences of their
track placement, their parents will. To the degree that parents care about
their children, they will also have an increased incentive to aid their children's
learning before the tracking point, and they are likely to push their children
harder as well.
Across countries, tracking policies may also aect the early curricula or teach-
ing styles in a more institutionalized way. The whole educational system may
have evolved towards stressing early achievement more. Of course, the di-
rection of causality may also run the other way if early achievement oriented
countries have refrained from delaying the tracking point (cf. Betts 2010).
To at least some degree, incentive eects cause students to do better at tests
rather than learn more on an underlying level (cf. Klein et al. 2000, Jacob
2005). This is a problem if we want to use incentives to increase underlying
achievement. For the methodological implications however, the measured
scores are more relevant than underlying achievement. Incentive eects can
lead to inated test scores relative to long-term eects of underlying achieve-
ment, whether the disparity is caused by temporary bumps in underlying or
in measured achievement.
3 UK evidence
Since the Second World War, the UK has gradually gone from a tracked to a
comprehensive school system. In the old system, students were split around
4age 11, after which they either entered an upper track grammar school, or
a lower-track secondary modern, at least partly based on an achievement
test. In the new system, all students attended a comprehensive school in
order to make available to all children\all that is valuable in grammar school
education"(Government Circular 10/65, 1965).
The Labour government had entered the 1964 elections with a promise to
abolish the tracked educational system, and wanted to impose the new com-
prehensive system \as rapid as possible." Even so,the Labour government
\requested" rather than demanded that LEAs change their policies, and the
rate of change was initially limited. The hesitant Labour attitude was in-
duced both by practical and political concerns. On the one hand, extensive
planning was needed in order to create the new schools, in part because
of existing investment in school buildings. On the other hand, Local Ed-
ucation Authorities had had considerable autonomy in setting educational
policies themselves since 1944, and their position was strengthened by the
rather narrow Labour majority in parliament in combination with opposition
against reform from within the Labour party. This lead the policy change
to be implemented in a region-by-region, school-by-school fashion, both by
merging or converting existing schools and by creating new ones. (Govern-
ment Circular 10/65, 1965, Benn and Chitty 1996, ch. 1, Kerckho et al.
1996, ch. 2)
The survey most appropriate to study the UK reform is the longitudinal
National Child Development Study (2010). It follows all those born in Great
Britain in the week of the 3rd of March 1958. The 1958 cohort turned 11
in 1969, when one part of them were selected into one of two tracks, while
the other part entered the comprehensive school system. I will use the 1958
sweep (at the time called Perinatal Mortality Survey) as well as the 1965,
1969 and 1974 sweeps, when the subjects were 0, 7, 11 and 16 years old.
Merging the dierent sweeps, I have 6435 complete cases.
The 1974 sweep of the NCDS recorded the tracking status and reform year
of the school the individuals were attending at that point. This measure
can be used to reconstruct the year of reform relative to 1969, the year the
5individuals entered the secondary school system.
The distribution of students exposed to the dierent reform years can be
seen from Figure 1. The students on the left side of the gure entered a
secondary school that had reformed before 1969, which means that the stu-
dents entering them could be sure of its comprehensive status. Those on the
right side entered a school that reformed only after 1969, that is after our
cohort had entered them. Students may have had some information on the
coming reform, but their subjective probability of entering a tracked system
will have been smaller the later the reform actually took place. Students in
the `later' category were never part of a comprehensive school during their
educational career.
There are multiple measures of age 11 achievement in the data: a general
ability test containing both verbal and non-verbal items, a reading compre-
hension test and a mathematics/arithmetic test. In addition to these, we
have teacher assessments of student abilities in dierent domains.
I synthesize all these variables into one in a two step process. First, I nor-
malize each test score distribution because their shapes are arbitrary and
skewed, and contain little cardinal level information on underlying achieve-
ment (Koerselman 2011). Then, I extract the rst principal component of
the normalized scores to end up with a measure of general achievement. This
process also has the advantage of reducing measurement error from any of
the specic tests.
I encode the school tracking status at age 11, Ts, as a school-level dummy
indicating whether the school turned comprehensive before 1969, or after. I
also select two groups of control variables, listed in Table 5 in the appendix.
The rst group Ai consists of standardized age 7 scores and teacher ratings.
These include the results of a word recognition and word comprehension test,
a copying designs test to assess perceptuo-motor abilities, a draw-a-man test
to assess general mental and perceptual abilities, and an arithmetic test.
The second group Xi is a selection of a wide variety of parent and student
background variables. I choose not to linearize any of these variables and
treat them all as categorical in order to capture as much variation as possible.
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Figure 1: Year of school going comprehensive: number of students in the sample. The
students in the sample all turned 11 in 1969, at which point they were split into tracks
in the pre-reform system. Those entering secondary schools having reformed before 1969
(left) should be expected to have lower age 11 scores than those entering schools that
reformed later (right).
Unfortunately for our purposes, reforms were not implemented at random.
As can be seen from Table 5, right-wing, richer areas were underrepresented
among the areas that moved to a comprehensive system rst (Benn and
Chitty 1996, ch. 1, Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles 2004), leading to a negative
correlation between 1969 reform status and school inputs. A simple compar-
ison of tracked and comprehensive areas or schools will therefore appear to
show incentive eects even if none exist in reality. Successful identication
of the causal eect of tracking will have to come from adequately controlling
for primary school inputs such as ability and parental background. Selection
problems can however be expected to smaller than for later-age educational
7analyzes because the primary school system is relatively homogeneous.
Additionally, there may be selection within and between regions due to non-
compliance. Families with good students can move to a tracked area when
faced with a comprehensive secondary school, while families with poor stu-
dents may seek out comprehensive areas. In areas where upper track schools
remained, the new comprehensive school may in eect become the new lower
track school, with the upper track school attracting all good pupils. Since
we can control for ability and background, both forms of selection will lead
to an overestimate of incentive eects only to the degree that movers are
unobservably dierent.
To take into account the hierarchical nature of the data, I estimate a multi-
level or hierarchical linear model (e.g. Gelman and Hill 2007, Pinheiro and
Bates 2009) with regressors and error terms on dierent levels. For example,
in the rst specication
yi =  + Ts + "s + "i (1)
individual achievement yi is regressed on a school level tracking variable Ts,
and includes error terms both on the school and on the individual level.
Adding individual-level control matrices Ai and Xi allows us to explore the
estimated eects of these background factors on an individual level, while
retaining a school level estimate of the incentive eect of tracking.
yi =  + Ts + Ai + "s + "i (2)
yi =  + Ts + Ai + Xi + "s + "i (3)
The results of these specications can be seen from the Table 1. The rst
column shows the unadjusted relationship between age 11 scores and the
tracking variable is 0.15 of a UK standard deviation. This is a sizable dif-
ference, but probably an overestimate of the causal eect since early reform
areas were poorer on average.
Turning to column (2), we can see that the estimated eect indeed declines
8Dependent variable: UK achievement age 11 (1969)
specication (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
School not comprehensive at age 11 (T) 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08
0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03
age 7 scores and ratings (Ai) yes yes yes yes yes
additional controls (Xi) yes yes yes yes
number of students 6435 6435 6435 5109 6435 6435
grouping schools schools schools schools LEAs years
number of groups 616 616 616 528 156 10
Table 1: Incentive eects in the UK. Students who knew their lower secondary school
would be comprehensive score lower than those who had reason to expect a tracked school.
Standard errors in italics.
to 0.10. If we are lucky, the inclusion of age 7 test scores is enough to control
for the nonrandom nature of the tracking reforms. In column (3), I have
added all background variables in Xi as well. The estimate changes very
little between the specications, and is now 0.09. This strongly suggests that
age 7 test scores pick up most of the selection, and that even less selection
will be left after the inclusion of Xi.
Even if we can control for the non-randomness of reform areas, we are still
left with possible problems of student selection between and within areas. I
rerun specication (3) to include nonmovers only. This reduces the number
of students from 6435 to 5109, and the number of schools from 616 to 528
(the sampling method causes individual schools to be represented by small
numbers of students). As can be seen from column (4), the results are still
unchanged at 0.09.
Next, I look at possible selection within areas by using the percentage of
students exposed to a tracked school within each area as the measure of
tracking for each student. I dene an area as the Local Education Authority:
the policy-setting authority. There are 156 LEAs in the sample. As can be
seen from column (5) however, the point estimate is still unchanged. suggest-
ing that within-LEA selection is not a problem given the controls available
to us.
As an additional check, I group all schools together by reform year, and dene





































































Figure 2: Secondary schools left of the divide turned comprehensive before the NCDS
students could enter them. Achievement estimates from specication 6. Dotted lines
indicate the year-level errors.
tracking as a year-level variable.
yi =  + Ty + Ai + Xi + "y + "i (6)
Even with a low number of year observations, the tracking estimate is still
signicantly dierent from zero, at a slightly lower point estimate of 0.08
because the results are now weighted by year rather than by school. An
illustration of this specication can be seen from Figure 2.
I also rerun specications (1) and (2) with age 7 achievement as the depen-
dent variable as a kind of placebo test under the assumption that incentive
eects should be weaker the longer before the tracking point we measure
10achievement. Unfortunately, we cannot control for early age scores when us-
ing them as the dependent variable. Still, as can be seen from Table 6 in
the appendix, the estimated treatment eect is much smaller and not signi-
cantly dierent from zero for age 7 outcomes. This is additional evidence for
the credibility of the original specication.
Do incentive eects dier by gender or background? I add an interaction
with gender to specication 3. Incentive eects are not signicantly dierent
between boys and girls. I also add interactions on father's socioeconomic
status to specication 2, but no monotonic pattern can be seen, and the
uncertainty of the interactions is large. I have illustrated these results in
Figure 3.
Summarizing, incentive eects look credible in the UK setting. The biggest
threats to identication are the non-random nature of changes in tracking
policies as well as noncompliance by parents and students. The estimated
eect of tracking on achievement growth between ages 7 and 11 is however
virtually unchanged when we add background variables as controls, lending
credibility to the identication strategy. Neither excluding movers nor using
LEA-level tracking variables change the point estimate much. Conclusions
are even robust to grouping observations per reform year rather than by
school, and survive an early-age placebo test.
4 International evidence
The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement
administers various standardized tests in a large number of countries, which
allows us to look for incentive eects cross-sectionally. I use two waves of two
of the most well-known studies: the Trends in International Mathematics and
Science Study TIMSS, and the Progress in International Reading Literacy
Study (IEA 1995, 2001, 2003, 2006). PIRLS is an internationally comparable
early age reading literacy survey. TIMSS surveys mathematics and science
literacy at three dierent grades, of which I use the earliest. Both surveys








































































































































Figure 3: Estimated incentive eects for dierent subgroups. The gender-specic eect is
conditional on all controls in specication 3 except height. The specic eect for dierent
levels of socioeconomic status for the father is conditioned on all controls in specication
2. Bars indicate the 95% condence interval. The size of the eect is not signicantly
dierent between boys and girls. No monotonic pattern can be found in the socio-economic
background of the student.
the participating countries. I take the average of TIMSS mathematics and
science scores to get a more general measure of achievement.
I take tracking information from the Eurybase database (Eurydice 2008), as
well as from a variety of other sources. The tracking variable I will use is the
age at which a substantial proportion of students will be tracked into dierent
schools. This denition is close to that of Hanushek and Woessmann (2006),
and aids a comparison with their results. Even though I try to pinpoint the
start of tracking in each country to an exact age, I use a dummy variable in
the analysis, indicating tracking at an age of 14 or earlier.
12weighting
by student by country
variable    
test score 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.89
per capita GDP ('0 000 1995 USD) 1.46 0.99 1.41 0.82
educational expenditures (%GDP) 4.52 1.32 4.99 1.58




Table 2: International data: descriptive statistics.
As control variables, I use real per capita purchasing power-adjusted GDP
(expressed in 10 000 USD) from the Penn World Table (2006) as well as edu-
cational expenditures as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank EdStat
database (2011). For GDP, the year of the observation is always 1995, for
educational expenditures, it is the available observation the closest to 1995.
Descriptive statistics for these and other variables can be seen from Table 2.
I have complete data on 1040596 students in 51 countries.
Like before, I estimate a multilevel model to take into account the errors
individuals have in common when they share a class, school or country. The
error structure in all specications is given by
" = "cn + "s + "cl + "i
where subscripts cn, s, cl and i stand for country, school, class and individual
respectively.
The rst specication gives the raw relationship between individual scores yi,
and the country-level tracking regime Tcn. The multilevel model takes care
of the dierence in levels in its calculation of standard errors of the various
parameter estimates. I add a matrix Di indicating whether the score is a
PIRLS or a TIMSS score.
yi =  + Tcn + Di + " (7)
13Dependent variable: international early age achievement
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
tracking 0.26 0.11 0.22 0.23 0.25
0.16 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.07
GDP 0.39 0.01 0.00 0.01
0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04
expenditures -0.08 0.03 0.02 0.03
0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02
books at home 0.14
0.00






students 1040596 1040596 515788 515788 515788
countries 51 51 28 28 28
Table 3: International evidence for incentive eects; pooled multilevel regression based on
international data. Standard errors in italics.
The results can be seen from column (7) in Table 3. Countries with early
tracking clearly have higher score means, with the mean dierence as large
as 0.26 standard deviations of international student test scores.
There is no reason to assume that countries have adapted tracking policies
at random, and the observed correlation may be mere selection. To make an
attempt to control for this, I include real per capita GDP and educational
expenditures in the next specication. Both variables are contained in the
country level matrix Ccn.
yi =  + Tcn + Di + Ccn + " (8)
The estimates from this specication can be seen from column 8. Estimated
incentive eects are now smaller at 0.11 standard deviations.
There is probably still much unobserved heterogeneity left. Also, the tracking
measure used is most relevant in a European context, as it classies within-
school tracking countries as late tracking (Betts 2010). For both reasons,
























































Figure 4: An illustration of the EEA estimate of incentive eects from specication (9).
Early tracking countries have higher conditional early test scores. The solid line represents
the estimate, circles indicate the country-level errors.
member countries, and rerun the previous specication.
The estimates from this specication can be seen from column (9). At 0.22,
the eects are now much larger, but also much more precisely estimated.
This is exactly what should be expected if the tracking variable has classical
measurement error for non-EEA countries. Another indication that this is the
better specication is that the estimated eect of educational expenditures
now has the correct sign, even if it is still insignicant.
I have illustrated the estimate from specication (9) in Figure 4. As can be
seen from the gure, a linear specication may seem to t the data better,
but the results would become more sensitive to the exact tracking ages we
assign to late tracking countries.
15I try to estimate whether incentive eects dier for children with dierent
parental backgrounds. For this, I use a dummy variable Bi which indicates
whether the student has one case of books or more at home. This variable is
available for all four surveys.
Books at home are a good measure of parental background. The data are
derived from a student questionnaire, and young children should be expected
to report alternative measures of parental background such as educational
attainment or exact occupation with considerable error. Books at home
is also more easily compared internationally than education, occupation or
income, it is a valid international proxy for family background (Schuetz 2008)
and actually seem capture the reading culture driving the intergenerational
transmission of educational attainment (Esping-Andersen 2004).
yi =  + Tcn + Di + Ccn + Bi + (Bi  Tcn) + " (10)
Because this specication includes an interaction between variables on two
dierent levels, I need to bootstrap the standard error for the interaction
term.
Results can be seen from column (10). Students with more than one case of
books at home score higher on average, but the interaction with tracking is
insignicant and close to zero.
In the last specication, I check whether the eects are dierent for boys
than for girls. Fi is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual is
female.
yi =  + Tcn + Di + Ccn + Fi + (Fi  Tcn) + " (11)
Looking at column (11) of Table 3, we can see that the dierences between
boys and girls are small, and that the interaction is not signicantly dierent
from zero even though it is estimated at 0.05. Both the unclear dierences in
parental background and the insignicantly smaller incentive eects for girls
mirror the UK ndings.
Hanushek and Woessmann make a slightly dierent assessment of the track-
16ing age variable, even if they are dene tracking in the same way. A re-run
of my regressions with an age 14 tracking dummy based on the Hanushek
and Woessmann variable gives higher and more precise point estimates in
specications (7) and (8), but makes no dierence in the EEA sample of the
later specications.
All in all, international test score data provide us with some evidence for
incentive eects of curriculum tracking. The tracking variable is highly sig-
nicant at in the European sample, which is unusual for any analysis includ-
ing so few country-level observations. Nevertheless, we should realize that
cross-country comparisons are inherently sensitive to omitted variable bias.
5 Discussion
Given economic intuition as well as previous empirical research on high-stakes
testing, it should be expected that tracking has an incentive eect on test
scores before its start; parents, teachers and students should all be expected
to respond to the incentives created.
In this paper, I nd empirical evidence to support this hypothesis. In UK
data, tracking seems to cause an incentive eect of 0.09 UK standard devia-
tions. Within the European Economic Area, tracking is associated with 0.22
international standard deviations higher scores. These estimates are large,
but of the same order of magnitude as the 0.2{0.3 Jacob (2005) nds for a
high-stakes test.
While it is hard to interpret the results of the international analysis causally
on their own, they add a line of evidence to the UK results, where the eect
seems well-identied.
The implications of incentive eects are twofold. On the one hand, they are
of methodological importance. A causal eect of tracking extending to the
age before it start implies that value added estimates (see e.g. Todd and
Wolpin 2003) of the long-term eect of tracking are misspecied. Because
pre-tracking scores are inated in early tracking systems, a value-added spec-
17category authors year mean eect
comprehensive school reform, panel data Pekkarinen et al. 2009 {
comprehensive school reform, cross-section Kim et al. 2003 +
Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles 2004 +
international cross-section Hanushek and Woessmann 2006 {
experimental Duo et al. 2008 +
Table 4: Important studies of the mean eect of tracking.
ication which controls for omitted variables using pre-tracking scores will
underestimate the later-age long-term eect of tracking.
If we accept the invalidity of value-added specications, we can reconcile
previous studies on the long-term eect of tracking. I have listed some current
current papers on the mean eect of tracking in Table 4. The eect on
the mean is negative in the panel data papers as well as in Hanushek and
Woessmann.
We should not be surprised to nd an apparent negative eect of tracking in
studies of post war reforms such as Pekkarinen et al. The reforms simultane-
ously changed the tracking structure and upgraded the quality of education
of those previously in the lower track. If a country with a modern voca-
tional track such as Germany were to postpone it's tracking point today, the
positive eects could be much smaller.
The other main study nding a negative eect is that of Hanushek and Woess-
mann. Hanushek and Woessmann however use a value-added specication,
controlling for pre-tracking achievement. If one believes that tracking has
incentive eects, this specication is invalid, and leads to downward biased
estimates of the mean eect of tracking. They nd an eect not signicantly
dierent from zero when omitting early scores.
The other authors all nd a positive eect of tracking on mean scores. I thus
conclude that a positive eect of tracking on mean test scores is the most
consistent with the data. Of course, we should remember that the eects of
tracking on inequality and intergenerational mobility are large, more certain
and perhaps more important as well.
18It should also be noted that Manning and Pischke (2006) reject UK studies
on tracking because they nd that test score growth between age 7 and
11 is correlated with tracking policies. It is this very phenomenon which I
describe as incentive eects. If we believe that measured incentive eects can
be causal, we should therefore not reject the UK literature on these grounds.
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overall tracked compr.
variable name mean sd mean mean
dependent variable yi
Achievement age 11 0.00 1.00 0.05 -0.18
early ability Ai
Arithmetic score age 7 0.00 1.00 0.02 -0.07
Copying designs score age 7 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.05
Drawing score age 7 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.03
Reading score age 7 0.00 1.00 0.03 -0.13
Creativity rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.02 -0.06
Numbers rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.03 -0.11
Oral ability rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.05
Reading rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.03 -0.12
World awareness rating age 7 0.00 1.00 0.02 -0.09
Additional controls Xi
Female 0.49 0.49 0.50
Height age 11
1st quintile group 0.19 0.18 0.21
1st quintile group 0.19 0.19 0.17
2nd quintile group 0.18 0.19 0.18
3rd quintile group 0.19 0.19 0.18
4th quintile group 0.19 0.19 0.18
5th quintile group 0.07 0.07 0.08
Father gure
natural father 0.92 0.92 0.90
other 0.05 0.05 0.06
no information 0.03 0.03 0.04
Attended nursery
public 0.02 0.02 0.03
private 0.04 0.04 0.02
other preschool 0.03 0.03 0.04
did not attend or no information 0.91 0.91 0.92
Father reads to child
often 0.33 0.34 0.31
occasionally 0.33 0.33 0.34
hardly ever 0.26 0.26 0.27
no information 0.07 0.07 0.07
Mother reads to child
often 0.46 0.47 0.43
occasionally 0.34 0.33 0.36
hardly ever 0.15 0.15 0.16
no information 0.04 0.04 0.05
Socio-economic status father
continued on next page
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overall tracked compr.
variable name mean sd mean mean
professional 0.04 0.05 0.03
manegerial/technical 0.16 0.17 0.13
skilled nonmanual 0.09 0.09 0.09
skilled manual 0.43 0.42 0.45
semi-skilled 0.16 0.16 0.17
unskilled 0.05 0.05 0.06
no information 0.06 0.06 0.06
Father's education ISCED
5 0.03 0.03 0.02
3 0.17 0.17 0.15
2 0.54 0.54 0.52
1 0.01 0.01 0.02
no information 0.25 0.24 0.29
Mother's education ISCED
5 0.02 0.02 0.01
3 0.20 0.20 0.19
2 0.57 0.57 0.56
1 0.01 0.01 0.01
no information 0.21 0.20 0.23
Father reads books
often 0.47 0.48 0.42
occasionally 0.20 0.19 0.23
hardly ever 0.27 0.26 0.27
no information 0.07 0.07 0.08
Mother reads books
often 0.32 0.33 0.29
occasionally 0.21 0.21 0.21
hardly ever 0.42 0.41 0.44
no information 0.05 0.05 0.05
Accomodation type
house 0.86 0.86 0.84
at 0.07 0.07 0.07
rooms 0.01 0.01 0.02
no information or other 0.05 0.00 0.00
Father born
British Isles 0.92 0.93 0.91
Eire or Ulster 0.03 0.04 0.03
other 0.04 0.04 0.06
Mother born
British Isles 0.93 0.94 0.91
Eire or Ulster 0.03 0.03 0.03
other 0.04 0.03 0.06
Poor at English age 7
no 0.97 0.98 0.96
somewhat 0.01 0.01 0.02
certainly 0.00 0.00 0.01
continued on next page
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variable name mean sd mean mean
no information 0.01 0.01 0.02
Child goes reluctantly to school, age 7
no 0.86 0.86 0.86
yes 0.10 0.10 0.10
no information 0.04 0.04 0.04
Number of students 6435 5133 1302
Number of schools 616 450 166
Table 5: NCDS: student-weighted descriptive statistics.
dependent variable age 11 age 7
specication (1) (2) (3) (4)
School not comprehensive at age 11 (T) 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.03
0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
controls (Xi) yes yes
number of students 6435 6435 6435 6435
grouping schools schools schools schools
number of groups 616 616 616 616
Table 6: Placebo test for UK incentive eects using early age scores.
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